Why soldiers get a kick out of killing

April 26, 2010

sem título

By John Horgan Apr 23, 2010

Do some soldiers enjoy killing? If so, why? This question is thrust upon us by the recently released video of U.S. Apache helicopter pilots shooting a Reuters cameraman and his driver in Baghdad in 2007. Mistaking the camera of the Reuters reporter for a weapon, the pilots machine-gunned the reporter and driver and other
nearby people.

The most chilling aspect of the video, which was made public by Wikileaks, is the chatter between two pilots, whose names have not been released. As Elizabeth
Bumiller of
The New York Times put it, the soldiers "revel in their kill." "Look at those dead bastards," one pilot says. "Nice," the other replies.

The exchange reminds me of a Times story from March 2003, during the U.S. invasion of Baghdad. The reporter quotes Sgt. Eric Schrumpf, a Marine sharpshooter, saying, "We had a great day. We killed a lot of people." Noting that his troopkilled an Iraqi woman standing near a militant, Schrumpf adds, "I’m sorry, but the chick was in the way."

Does the apparent satisfaction—call it the Schrumpf effect—that some soldiers take in killing stem primarily from nature or nurture? Nature, claims Richard Wrangham, an anthropologist at Harvard University and an
authority on chimpanzees. Wrangham asserts that natural selection embedded in both male humans and chimpanzees—our closest genetic relatives—an innate propensity for "intergroup
coalitionary killing"
[pdf], in which members of one group attack members of a rival group. Male humans "enjoy the opportunity" to kill others, Wrangham says, especially if they run little risk of
being killed themselves.

Several years ago, geneticists at Victoria
in New Zealand linked violent male aggression to a variant of a gene that encodes for
the enzyme monoamine oxidase A, which regulates the function of neurotransmitters such as dopamine and serotonin. According to the researchers, the so-called "warrior gene" is carried by 56 percent of Maori men, who are renowned for being "fearless warriors," and only 34 percent of Caucasian males.

But studies of World War II veterans suggest that very few men are innately bellicose. The sychiatrists Roy Swank and Walter Marchand found that 98 percent of soldiers who endured 60 days of continuous combat suffered psychiatric symptoms, either temporary or permanent. The two out of 100 soldiers who seemed unscathed by prolonged combat displayed "aggressive psychopathic
personalities," the
psychiatrists reported. In other words, combat didn’t drive these men crazy because they were crazy to begin with.

Surveys of WWII infantrymen carried out by U.S. Army Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall found that only 15 to 20 percent had fired their weapons in combat, even when ordered to do so. Marshall concluded
that most soldiers avoid firing at the enemy because they fear killing as well as being killed. "The average and healthy individual," Marshall contended in his postwar book
Men Against Fire, "has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility…At the vital point he becomes a conscientious objector."

Critics have challenged Marshall’s claims, but the U.S. military took them so seriously that it revamped its training to boost firing rates in subsequent wars, according to Dave Grossman, a
former U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel and professor of psychology at West Point. In his 1995 book
On Killing, Grossman argues that Marshall’s results have been corroborated by reports from World War I, the American Civil War, the Napoleonic wars and other conflicts. "The singular lack of enthusiasm for killing one’s fellow man has existed throughout military history," Grossman asserts.

The reluctance of ordinary men to kill can be overcome by intensified training, direct commands from officers, long-range weapons and propaganda that glorifies the soldier’s cause and dehumanizes the enemy. "With the proper conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and will kill," Grossman writes. Many soldiers who kill enemies in battle are initially exhilarated, Grossman says, but later they often feel profound revulsion and remorse, which may transmute into post-traumatic stress disorder and other ailments. Indeed, Grossman believes that the troubles experienced by many combat veterans are evidence of a "powerful, innate human
resistance toward killing one’s own species."

In other words, the Schrumpf effect is usually a product less of nature than of nurture—although "nurture" is an odd term for training that turns ordinary young men into enthusiastic killers.

John Horgan, a former Scientific American staff writer, directs the Center for Science Writings at Stevens Institute of Technology.


Afghanistan landmines and explosives

April 23, 2010

Afghanisthan Ordnance Identification Guide

Prepared by the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Indin Head, Maryland 18 August 2004

Distribution Statement A : Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited

Despite approved for unlimited distribution, this guide is not disponible for the public. The guide is at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/21985753 with AKO or DKO login required

This guide provides identification information for approximately 1200 ordnance items in the following categories. The high-resolution version contains images at 300 dpi and is optimized for printing high-quality along with clear, crisp images.

Dod Leaks: Download these files !

Front Cover +Table of Contents


Dispenser, Cluster and Launcher


Fuze/Firing Device



Guided Missile



Improvised Explosive Device

Miscellaneous Explosive Device

Depth Charge or other Underwater


Afghanistan landmines and explosives

After 25 years of war, Afghanistan has become one of the countries most affected by landmines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the world. Every month some 60 explosives accidents are registered in Afghanistan, whilst a large number of accidents are not registered at all. Some 66% of the reported accidents are caused by the unexploded ordnance, 50% of the victims die before they reach a hospital. The origins of this misery derive from the Soviet occupation period, but the following civil war between the Afghan government and the Mujahedin movement, the wars between various warlords and the Taliban war have all contributed to the mine and UXO problem. The Coalition war against terror with extensive bombing campaigns has only added to the existing contamination. (Danish Demining Group) (The Group has recovered and disposed of more than 1 million unexploded ordnances and 100.000 landmines in Afghanistan)

Naval EOD Technology Division

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division is a field activity of the United States Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). It is located 30 miles South of Washington, D.C. in Charles County, Maryland. NAVEODTECHDIV is a unique support activity administered by the U.S. Navy and utilized by all the Armed Services who work together to determine Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) requirements. (Wikipedia)


What Would Daniel Ellsberg Do With the Pentagon Papers Today?

April 22, 2010

Published: April 18, 2010

Associated Press

In 1971, Mr. Ellsberg passed to a reporter for The New York Times a copy of a secret report casting doubt on the war in Vietnam.

Two weeks ago, Wikileaks.org released a classified video showing a United States Apache helicopter killing 12 civilians in Baghdad. The reaction was so swift and powerful — an edited version has been viewed six million times on YouTube — that the episode provoked many questions about how such material is now released and digested.

Put another way: if someone today had the Pentagon Papers, or the modern equivalent, would he still go to the press, as Daniel Ellsberg did nearly 40 years ago and wait for the documents to be analyzed and published? Or would that person simply post them online immediately?

Mr. Ellsberg knows his answer.

“As of today, I wouldn’t have waited that long,” he said in an interview last week. “I would have gotten a scanner and put them on the Internet.”

In early 1971, Mr. Ellsberg, an analyst at the RAND Corporation, passed a New York Times reporter a copy of a top-secret report casting doubt on the war in Vietnam, the so-called Pentagon Papers. For months, he said, he waited, unsure if The New York Times would ever publish.

When the Nixon administration went to court and prevented The Times from publishing the full report, Mr. Ellsberg gave copies to The Washington Post and other newspapers.

Today, he says, there is something enticing about being independent — not at the whim of publishers or government attempts to control release. “The government wouldn’t have been tempted to enjoin it, if I had put it all out at once,” he said. “We got this duel going between newspapers and the government.”

He does concede that something might have been lost had Wikileaks been around in 1971. “I don’t think it would have had the same impact, then or now, as having it in The Times,” he said. The government’s attempt to block publication — something ended by the Supreme Court — was the best publicity, he said.

But playing the government off newspapers, and newspapers against each other, still does not compare with the power of the World Wide Web. “Competition worked in a useful way,” he said. “But the Internet has this viral aspect. It gets sent around and gets a broader audience.”

In all his strategizing about getting attention for the material he leaked, Mr. Ellsberg can sound a lot like Julian Assange, the head of Wikileaks, who is unabashed in saying that one of his group’s principal obligations is “to get maximum political impact — to do justice to our material.”

Mr. Assange, true to that pledge, has been on a publicity tour that included a stop on Comedy Central’s “Colbert Report.” In an interview in a Greenwich Village cafe last week, Mr. Assange (seated facing the door, Colbert show gift bag in tow) was quick to explain his place in the media landscape.

Someone connected like Mr. Ellsberg today, he said, is best advised to go to a mainstream outlet to get maximum publicity — much as Mr. Assange will speak to whoever gives him a microphone — but use Wikileaks as a home for the entire cache of documents.

He also acknowledged that April 5, the release date of the Apache video, was picked in anticipation of a slow news day (though, as it happened, the mining disaster in West Virginia occurred that day).

Mr. Assange has been criticized for creating an edited version of the video (he also published the longer, unedited version) and for concluding that the killings were “murders.”

The United States Army has said military protocol was followed in the incident, as its review at the time concluded. And Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said last week that the Apache video was misleading and lacked context — the equivalent of seeing the war “through a soda straw.”

But beyond questioning whether the use of deadly force was justified, Mr. Assange said the videos were needed to bring the reality of war to Americans.

“Some people say that war is war and that we should expect these kinds of casualties to occur in war,” Mr. Assange said. “But these kinds of war-is-war arguments are superfluous unless the public knows what war is.”

One of the consequences of the publicity surrounding the video is that the military may keep fewer of them and certainly will not circulate them as freely, said Fred Burton, vice president of intelligence at Stratfor, a global intelligence agency, who has written about his experiences as a counterterrorism agent for the government.

“It’s the same kind of argument you have with your kids,” he said. “Be careful what you post to Facebook, because it will come back to haunt you when you go to a job interview.”

The timing couldn’t be worse, he added: “Ultimately, it hurts the U.S. intelligence operation” because it hinders efforts to improve communication among agencies.

For Mr. Ellsberg, leaking is about informing the American public. “The Internet is there to bring out this evidence, when a terribly wrongful, reckless criminal act is being prepared.” He said that earlier on, Wikileaks tried to recruit him as an adviser but he was skeptical. It looked like a way for the authorities to monitor leakers, he said, either by design or through surveillance.

“I didn’t believe that the technology could keep them away,” he said. “But the anger of the government over this leak suggests that they have been successful so far.”

Mr. Ellsberg said that he had made a donation to Wikileaks after watching the Apache video. Given the surveillance he has undergone in the last 40 years or so, he doubts that the contribution raised any eyebrows in government circles.

“I am sure I didn’t get on any new list by giving a contribution,” he said.

A version of this article appeared in print on April 19, 2010, on page B3 of the New York edition.


Concerns About the Indictment of a Former NSA Official

April 22, 2010

Bryan Rahija
Project On Government Oversight (POGO)
Apr 21, 2010
Last week a grand jury indicted Thomas Drake, a former senior official at the National Security Agency (NSA), on charges of willful retention of classified information, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. The Department of Justice (DOJ) alleges that Drake leaked classified documents to a journalist and made significant contributions to articles that were published between February 2006 and November 2007.

The journalist has been identified as Siobhan Gorman, who during that time penned a series of articles for The Baltimore Sun highlighting waste, bureaucratic infighting, mismanagement, and failures of oversight surrounding the NSA’s controversial surveillance program.

POGO has serious concerns about this situation. First, the indictment and DOJ’s aggression towards Drake will no doubt have a chilling effect on whistleblowing in the national security community. We don’t know precisely which documents Drake is alleged to have given to Gorman. (Marc Ambinder notes that the fact that Drake has not actually been charged with leaking classified documents could signal an effort to prevent Drake from introducing sensitive information about the program at trial.“) But even the perception that a grand jury has indicted a primary source for information about waste at a government agency is enough to make whistleblowers think twice about coming forward with similar concerns or evidence.

On a deeper level, Drake’s decision to approach Gorman raises questions about the NSA’s ability to handle whistleblower complaints. Drake may not have been forced to go to the press if the agency was equipped with the proper channels to receive, evaluate, and address employee concerns. It’s also worth noting that Drake was introduced to the reporter by a Hill staffer, suggesting that Congress does not recognize its own role in both investigating classified programs and in protecting whistleblowers.

Ultimately, Drake’s decision to operate outside the agency suggests that his concerns initially fell on deaf ears. And sadly, given the history of the government’s treatment of national security whistleblowers, that would come as no surprise.

— Bryan Rahija


JSC Files on Predator Frequency Bands III

April 19, 2010

Joint Spectrum Center

Predator UAV Line-Of-Sight Datalink Terminal Radio Frequency Test Report

Prepared for
UAV Special Mission Office (ACC/DR-UAV)

September 2004

Prepared by
Steve Bonter, Diana R. Dunty, Jason Greene, and Dr. William Duff
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only

The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) line-of-sight command link and return link frequency assignments permit the simultaneous operation of four General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated (GA-ASI) Predator air vehicles
at the Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF).

With increased operations of the RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator, and the introduction of MQ-9 Hunter-Killer (Predator B®) operations, a requirement was identified for the simultaneous operation of seven Predator UAVs at ISAFAF and an additional set of frequencies for ground test.

The Air Combat Command UAV Special Mission Office requested that the Joint Spectrum Center investigate ways to satisfy the Predator frequency requirements. The Joint Spectrum Center, with support from the Aeronautical Systems Center and GA-ASI, performed transmitter spurious emissions, transmitter emission bandwidth, transmitter broadband noise, receiver sensitivity, receiver selectivity, receiver adjacent-signal rejection, and receiver gain compression measurements of the datalink terminals. This report describes the test efforts and presents the test results. The data in this report was current as of 30 July 2004.


Supplement 1

Joint Spectrum Center
Supplement 1Common Data Link Frequency Migration Study

Prepared for
Aeronautical Systems Center
Reconnaissance Systems Program Office,
Sensors and Data Links
Common Data Link Program Office

October 2004

Consulting Report
Prepared by
Jonathan Timko, Ronald Mendolera, Joshua Gleason, and
Adekunle Adegorusi
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and DoD contractors only

The CDL system is a family of communication links designed to provide real-time connectivity and interoperability between multiple intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection platforms operated by the DoD and Government agencies. The CDL family is divided into five link classes.

• Class I: Ground-based applications with airborne platforms operating at speeds up to Mach 2.3 and altitudes up to 80,000 ft.

• Class II: Airborne applications with speeds up to Mach 5 and altitudes up to 150,000 ft.

• Class III: Airborne applications with speeds up to Mach 5 and altitudes up to 500,000 ft.

• Class IV: Terminals in satellites orbiting at 750 nmi.

• Class V: Terminals in relay satellites operating at altitudes greater than 750 nmi.

The CDL system is a full-duplex communication link that includes a forward link and a return link. The forward link is used to communicate command and control functions between the processing (surface) terminal and the gathering (airborne) terminal. The return link transfers sensor data from the airborne terminal back to the surface terminal.


Joint Spectrum Center

Common Data Link EMC Analysis

Aeronautical Systems Center
Reconnaissance Systems Program Office,
Sensors And Data Links
Common Data Link Program Office
September 2004

Prepared by
Adekunle Adegorusi, Jonathan Timko, and Ron Mendolera
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and US DoD contractors only

The Aeronautical Systems Center Common Data Link (CDL) Program Office requested that the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) conduct an electromagnetic compatibility analysis between the CDL communications-electronics equipment and Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) systems. The JSC identified FSS systems that operate in the 13.75 – 15.63-GHz frequency range.

Two analyses were performed to determine the potential for electromagnetic Interference (EMI) between the CDL and the various FSS systems
due to in-band and adjacent-band interference. For the CDL interfering with FSS systems, an analysis considering the CDL interfering with a -20-dB and -8.5-dB I/N criteria were conducted.

For FSS systems interfering with the CDL, a qualitative analysis was performed for the FSS system interfering with a -12-dB I/N criterion. An initial cull analysis was performed using mainbeam antenna gains. The initial cull analysis interactions were placed into one of two categories: “EMI not Predicted” or “EMI Predicted.”

Interactions in the EMI predicted group were analyzed further by taking into consideration mainbeam-to-sidelobe, sidelobe-tomainbeam, and sidelobe-to-sidelobe antenna coupling.


JSC Files on Predator Frequency Bands II

April 18, 2010

(Supersedes JSC-PR-04-049)
Joint Spectrum Center

Indian Springs C-Band Line-Of-Sight Frequency Requirements Analysis

Prepared For
Air Combat Command
UAV Special Mission Office (Acc/Dr-Uav)

January 2005.

Prepared by
Steve Bonter, Dr. William Duff, Amy Mangrum, and David Nelson
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution authorized to DoD Components only; Operational Use; January 2005.
Current frequency assignments for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) permit the simultaneous operation of four General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated Predator air vehicles at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF).

With increased operations of RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator, and the introduction of MQ-9 Hunter-Killer (Predator B®) operations, a requirement was identified for the simultaneous operation of seven Predator UAVs at ISAFAF requiring seven sets of frequencies and na additional set of frequencies for ground test. The Air Combat Command UAV Special Mission Office requested that the Joint Spectrum Center investigate alternative options that would allow all eight Predator frequency sets to operate simultaneously at the ISAFAF.

This analysis supersedes the previous version by adding high power taxi, intermodulation products analysis, and modification of the desired SSI % benchmark from 30 % SSI return link to 50 % SSI command link.

Of seven scenarios considered, two scenarios were recommended; the first, to modify the diplexer frequency band to enlarge the return link band, met the frequency requirements with unrestricted operations; the second, to improve diplexer filtering to enlarge the return link band, also met the frequency requirements.

Two other scenarios were recommended, with reservations: one considered the addition of a new tactical common datalink and the other considered the addition of a new Ku-band analog datalink (both options to be used in addition to the existing C-band datalink).

Joint Spectrum Center

C-Band And Ku-Band Uav Line-Of-Sight Data Link Emc Analysis For Two Operational Scenarios

Prepared for
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense (OASD)
Networks and Information Integration (NII) Spectrum Office
October 2004

Prepared by
Steve Bonter, Diana Dunty, and Amy Mangrum
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution Authorized to DoD Components Only; Operational Use; October 2004.

The Joint Spectrum Center conducted an electromagnetic compatibility analysis to determine the potential for electromagnetic interference (EMI) between the UAV Line-of-Sight Data Link Terminal and the communications-electronics (C-E) environment near Bisbee-Douglas International Airport and Whidbey Island Naval Air Station.

This analysis included the 4400 – 4940, 5250 – 5850, and
14400 – 15350 MHz frequency bands. Each frequency band had a potential for EMI between the UAV terminals and various C-E systems in the environment. Environmental systems analyzed included, but were not limited to: radar systems (fixed and mobile), terrestrial microwave links, telemetry systems, satellite downlink systems, and radio astronomy telescopes. Where potential EMI was
noted, mitigation techniques were recommended. The data presented in this report was current as of 8 September 2004

Joint Spectrum Center

Predator UAV Line-Of-Sight Data Link Terminal Radio Frequency Test Plan

Prepared for
UAV Special Mission Office (ACC/DR-UAV)
August 2003

Prepared by
Steve Bonter, Young Kim, and John Smith
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only; Test & Evaluation; August 2003.

The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) line-of-sight (LOS) command link (CL) and return link (RL) frequency assignments permit simultaneous operations of four General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated (GA-ASI) Predator air vehicles at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF).

With increased operations of RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator and the introduction of MQ-9 Hunter-Killer (Predator B®) operations, a requirement was identified for simultaneous operations of seven Predator UAVs at ISAFAF and an eighth set of frequencies for ground test.

The Air Combat Command UAV Special Mission Office (ACC/DR-UAV) requested that the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) investigate ways to satisfy the eight Predator frequency requirement. The JSC, with support from Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC/RAB) and GA-ASI, will perform transmitter emission bandwidth, transmitter broadband noise, receiver sensitivity, receiver selectivity, receiver adjacent-signal rejection, and receiver gain compression measurements of the data link terminals. This test plan was developed to support the test efforts.


JSC Files on Predator Frequency Bands I

April 18, 2010

Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)

The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC), a field activity of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), was established to provide advice and assistance on all matters regarding the electromagnetic battlespace. Support is provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military departments, combatant commands, defense agencies, and other agencies of the US Government. The JSC works closely with the Joint Staff, Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration on spectrum matters.
Direct support is provided to the Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Commanders on electromagnetic battlespace issues, including spectrum management and electronic warfare deconfliction. Support to DoD components and the US Government is provided through a sponsorreimbursed electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) program that provides EMC analyses for specific projects.

Predator MAE UAV

According to the Air Force, the Predator is a “Joint Forces Air Commander-owned theater asset for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition in support of the Joint Force commander.” Because the Predator is unmanned it is suitable for deployment in “moderate risk areas”, unsecured air space, “open ocean environments, and biological or chemical contaminated environments.” In addition, as the October 2001 attacks in Afghanistan have illustrated, the Predator can now perform a search and destroy mission with no apparent risk to US military personnel.

The Predator system was designed to provide constant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to US strategic and tactical forces. This system is operated by the 11th and 15th reconnaissance squadrons at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field in Nevada.

Technical Specifications

The Predator Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was developed as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) from January 1994 to June 1996. The Predator system is composed of three parts: the air vehicle [a derivative of the Gnat 750] with its associated sensors and communications equipment, the ground control station (GCS), and the product or data dissemination system. One Predator system has four air vehicles with sensors and data links, one Ground Control Station (GCS), and one Trojan Spirit II SATCOM system.

The air vehicle is a mid-wing monoplane with a slender fuselage housing the payload and fuel, a high aspect ratio wing, and inverted-V tails. A four-cylinder Rotax engine that requires 100-octane aviation gas powers the air vehicle. According to the The Air Force Fact Sheet the RQ-1A needs 5,000 by 125 feet of a hard surface runway. In addition, the vehicle requires line-of-sight with the GCS and all support components for the Predator system must be at a single location.

The air vehicle can be broken-down into six primary parts and packed into a container known as the “coffin.” The satellite communication system consists of a 20-foot satellite dish and its associated support equipment. This satellite system is especially important because is provides the Predator aerial vehicle to communicate beyond line-of-sight with its GCS. The benefits of this component system are that it can be easily deployed around the world.

The sensors include an electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) Versatron Skyball Model 18 with a zoom lens and a spotter lens, and a Westinghouse 783R234 synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The ground control station consists of a pilot position and a payload operator position, which are interchangeable, a Data Exploitation, Mission Planning and Communications (DEMPC) position where imagery is annotated and initially exploited, and a SAR workstation. The GCS is housed in a 30 ft x 8 ft x 8 ft commercial van.

The current data dissemination is through the TROJAN SPIRIT II (TS II), a Special Compartmented Information (SCI) satellite communications (SATCOM) system that allows transmission and receipt of secure voice and National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF) imagery data. The TS II physically consists of two High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and two trailer-mounted SATCOM antennas. Sensor imagery is disseminated from the Predator ground control station via the Trojan Spirit II SATCOM system using the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Live video is disseminated through the Joint Broadcast System (JBS).

Joint Spectrum Center

216 Sweeney Blvd, Room 109
Langley AFB, VA 23665

November 2003

Prepared by
Steve Bonter, Young Kim, Jonathan Timko, and Thu Luu
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution Authorized to DoD Components Only; Operational Use; November 2003. Other requests for this
document shall be referred to ACC/DR-UAV or JSC/J8.

The JSC conducted an electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) analysis to determine the potential for electromagnetic interference (EMI) between the Predator UAV LOS Data Link Terminal and the communications-electronics (C-E) environment near ISAFAF for four candidate frequency bands: 4.4-4.94, 5.25-5.85, 14.4-14.83, and 15.15-15.35 gigahertz (GHz). Since integration of Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) terminals into the UAV and ground data terminal (GDT) is planned, this analysis also included determining the potential for EMI between the TCDL configured Predator and the C-E environment near ISAFAF for the 14.4-14.83 and 15.15-15.35 GHz frequency bands.
Each frequency band had a potential for EMI between the terminals and various C-E systems in the environment. Environmental systems analyzed included, but were not limited to: radar systems (fixed and mobile), terrestrial microwave links, telemetry systems, satellite downlink systems, and radio astronomy (RA) telescopes.
Where potential EMI was noted, mitigation techniques were recommended. Analysis of the interactions where the RL transmitter was the source of the interference to terrestrial microwave links indicates that the 14.4-14.8 GHz band RL transmitter may cause interference to select transportable microwave links.
It is recommended that RL transmitter operations be coordinated with the Department of Energy. For six Department of Justice (DOJ) fixed microwave links, it is recommended that there be a minimum frequency separation of 11 megahertz (MHz) between the RL transmitter and fixed microwave link. All of the DOJ microwave links operate in the upper portion of the 4400-4940 MHz band, and therefore it is recommended that the RL for this band be located in the lower portion of this band below 4749 MHz.
For RA systems, frequency separation is required to preclude interference to the very long baseline array at Owens Valley Radio Observatory, Owens Valley, CA. There were no interactions involving radar systems, telemetry systems, and satellite downlink systems that resulted in predicted EMI.

DoD Leaks: Download the file!

Joint Spectrum Center

Prepared for
Air Combat Command UAV Special Mission Office (ACC/DR-UAV)
November 2003
Prepared by
Steve Bonter and Clifford Price
Alion Science and Technology
Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only; Operational Use; November 2003.

The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) line-of-sight command link and return link frequency assignments are authorized for simultaneous operations of four General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated Predator air vehicles at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF). With increased operational tempo of RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator and the introduction of MQ-9 Hunter-Killer (Predator B®) operations, requirements have been identified for simultaneous operations of seven
Predator air vehicles at IAFAF. As part of the RQ-1/MQ-1/9 beddown of communications architecture, ACC/DR-UAV requested the Joint Spectrum Center to perform electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) analyses to ensure EMC with unlicensed devices operating under the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), specifically CFR 47 Parts 15.245, 15.247, 15.249, 15.401, and Part 90.

Systems representative of CFR 47 Part 15 and Part 90 devices that operate in the 5250-5850 megahertz band were identified for analysis as follows:
• 15.245 industrial point-to-point microwave
• 15.247 residential indoor and industrial outdoor radio local area network (RLAN)
• 15.249 outdoor video surveillance
• 15.401 outdoor industrial unlicensed national information infrastructure (U-NII)
• 90 outdoor industrial dedicated short range communications (DSRC) systems
A first cull noise-limited analysis was performed. A detailed interference-limited analysis was performed for cases where electromagnetic interference (EMI) was predicted. A signal-to-noise ratio threshold (S/NT) was determined for each modulation. Signal-to-interference-plus-noise (S/(I+N)) was calculated. S/(I+N) was compared to S/NT to quantify interference potential.

No EMI problems were identified for the analyzed operational location. Operations in closer proximity to residential and industrial areas may cause interference to potential victim systems analyzed in this report.

DoD Leaks: Download the file!


Predator UAV C-Band Data Link Site-Independent Emc With 5-Ghz 47 C.F.R. Part 15 And Part 90 Devices

Prepared for
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense (OASD)
Networks and Information Integration Spectrum Office
May 2004

Prepared by
Steve Bonter
Alion Science and Technology

Distribution authorized to DoD Components only; Operational Use; May 2004.
Other requests shall be referred to OASD/NII or JSC/J8.

The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) line-of-sight (LOS) command link and return link frequency band is allocated to aeronautical radionavigation, maritime radionavigation, meteorological aids, and radiolocation services. The Predator LOS links are in the aeronautical mobile service and are considered out-of-band. As such, Predator LOS link spectrum supportability is on a noninterference basis.

The Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) authorizes unlicensed radio frequency (RF) devices in the frequency bands 5150 – 5350 MHz and 5725 – 5925 MHz. These RF devices utilize the same portion of the RF spectrum as the Predator LOS links, and they are being fielded at an accelerated rate. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration requested that the DoD Joint Spectrum Center determine the electromagnetic compatibility issues associated with Predator UAV LOS data links and unlicensed devices operating under the C.F.R. in the same electromagnetic environment.

A first cull noise-limited analysis was performed; where electromagnetic interference (EMI) was predicted, a detailed interferencelimited analysis was performed. For any remaining cases of potential EMI, possible mitigation techniques were identified. The data in this report was current as of January 2004.

Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis of the Predator UAV Line-Of-Sight Data Link Terminal With The Communications-Electronics Environment At Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary FieldPredator Uav C-Band Data Link Emc With 5-Ghz Cfr 47 Part 15 And Part 90 Devices

DoD Leaks: Download the file!


NSA Spied on Journalists?

April 18, 2010

Whistleblower Reveals Surveillance Target In an exclusive interview on MSNBC’s “Countdown with Keith Olbermann,” former NSA analyst Russell Tice says that the agency under the Bush administration secretly collected communications data on civilians, including journalists.

Video – Countdown video : Whistleblower reveals surveillance target

Following is a transcript of   interview:

OLBERMANN: It has taken less than 24 hours after the Bush presidency ended for a former analyst at the National Security Agency to come forward to reveal new allegations about how this nation was spied on by its own government, exclusively here on COUNTDOWN.

Our third story tonight, Russell Tice has already stood up for truth before this evening as one source for the revelation in 2005 by the “New York Times” that President Bush was eavesdropping on American citizens without warrants. Tonight, the next chapter for Mr. Tice, a chapter he feared to reveal while George Bush occupied the Oval Office, that under the collar of fighting terrorism, the Bush administration was also targeting specific groups of Americans for surveillance, non-terrorist Americans if you will.

Mr. Tice prepared to name one of those groups tonight. The NSA was already estimated to have collected millions of transmissions, e-mails and phone calls of average Americans simply by patching into the networks of cooperative telecommunications companies. You will recall the infamous room 641A at the AT&T Folsom Street facility in San Francisco, in which the whole of AT&T’s portion of the Internet was duplicated inside a room accessible only to the NSA.

Mr. Tice, however, was also involved in another program and told us that he was first directed to focus on these specific groups in order to weed them out from legitimate surveillance targets, but ultimately concluded that the weeding out was actually an internal NSA cover story for a real goal, which was simply spying on those Americans.

Initially, Mr. Bush told the nation all his surveillance was legal.


GEORGE W. BUSH, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Anytime you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it requires a
— a wiretap requires a court order.


OLBERMANN: After the “New York Times” revealed that to be a lie, Mr. Bush claimed his surveillance circumvented the constitutionally required process of obtaining a court-ordered warrant only in cases of clear links to terrorism.


BUSH: In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations.

Before we intercept these communications, the government must have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks.


OLBERMANN: Joining me now in his first public revelation of these charges is Russell Tice, former analyst with the National Security Agency. Thank you for your time, sir.

RUSSELL TICE, FORMER ANALYST, NSA: Thanks for having me.

OLBERMANN: Let’s start with the review. We heard the remarks from Mr. Bush in 2005, that only Americans who would have been eavesdropped on without a warrant were those who were talking to terrorists overseas. Based on what you know, what you have seen firsthand and what you have encountered in your experience, how much of that statement was true?

TICE: Well, I don’t know what our former president knew or didn’t know. I’m sort of down in the weeds. But the National Security Agency had access to all Americans’ communications, faxes, phone calls, and their computer communications. And that doesn’t — it didn’t matter whether you were in Kansas, you know, in the middle of the country, and you never made a communication — foreign communications at all. They monitored all communications.

OLBERMANN: To what degree is that likely to mean actual eavesdropping and actual inspection? In other words, if not actually read or monitored by the NSA, everything was collected by the NSA, recorded, archived? Do you have any idea to what degree the information was ever looked at, per se?

TICE: Well, it’s actually, even for the NSA, it’s impossible to literally collect all communications. Americans tend to be a chatty group. We have the best computers at the agency, but certainly not that good.

But what was done was a sort of an ability to look at the meta data, the signaling data for communications, and ferret that information to determine what communications would ultimately be collected. Basically, filtering out sort of like sweeping everything with that meta data, and then cutting down ultimately what you are going to look at and what is going to be collected, and in the long run have an analyst look at, you know, needles in a haystack for what might be of interest.

OLBERMANN: I mention that you say specific groups were targeted.
What group or groups can you tell us about?

TICE: Well, there’s sort of two avenues to look at this. What I just mentioned was sort of the low-tech dragnet look at this. The things that I specifically were involved with were more on the high-tech side. And try to envision, you know, the dragnets are out there, collecting all the fish and then ferreting out what they may. And my technical angle was to try to harpoon fish from an airplane kind of thing. So it’s two separate worlds.

But in the world that I was in, as to not harpoon the wrong people in some — in one of the operations that I was in, we looked at organizations just supposedly so that we would not target them. So that we knew where they were, so as not to have a problem with them.

Now, what I was finding out, though, is that the collection on those organizations was 24/7, and you know, 365 days a year, and it made no sense. And that’s — I started to investigate that. That’s about the time when they came after me, to fire me. But an organization that was collected on were U.S. news organizations and reporters and journalists.

OLBERMANN: To what purpose? I mean, is there a file somewhere full of every e-mail sent by all the reporters at the “New York Times?” Is there a recording somewhere of every conversation I had with my little nephew in upstate New York? Is it like that?

TICE: If it was involved in this specific avenue of collection, it would be everything. Yes. It would be everything.

OLBERMANN: Do you have a sense of why, as you discovered this? I mean, do you have a sense of what this was, if it was used, to what end?

TICE: I do not know. I do not know what was done with the collection. I’m sure the information — the collection was digitized and put on databases somewhere. I don’t know what was done with it from that point.

OLBERMANN: And this bait-and-switch sort of idea, that this — this is the discard pile, we are not going to look at the media, and then it becomes apparent to you that the discard pile is in fact the save pile.
How did that become apparent to you?

TICE: Well, as I was going for support for this particular organization, it sort of was dropped to me that, you know, this is 24/7. Because I was saying, you know, I need collection at this time, at this point for, you know, for a window of time. And I would say, will we have the capability at this particular point? And positioning assets, and I was ultimately told we don’t have to worry about that, because we’ve got it covered all the time. And that’s when it clicked in my head, this is not something that’s being done on a onesy basis, onesy-twosie. This is something that’s happening all the time.

OLBERMANN: In a broad sense, and I imagine this question could be asked a hundred times with much more specificity, but what other kinds of information are you aware of that was collected by the NSA on ordinary Americans?

TICE: On ordinary Americans? I don’t know. The parameters that were set for how to filter that — now we are back to the low-tech side
— were things like looking for parameters like if a terrorist normally would only make a phone call for one or two minutes, then you look for communications that are only one or two minutes long. Now, that also could be someone ordering a pizza and asking their significant other what sort of toppings that they wanted on their pizza. That is about a
one- to two-minute phone call.

OLBERMANN: We mentioned this idea of bait-and-switch, of this is the discard, no, it’s not; this is actually the target. Can you explain the maneuver, another sort of bait-and-switch that was worked with the congressional committees that would have had to be asking questions about stuff exactly like this?

TICE: Well, the agency would tailor some of their briefings to try to be deceptive for — whether it be, you know, a congressional committee or someone they really didn’t want to know exactly what was going on. So there would be a lot of bells and whistles in a briefing, and quite often, you know, the meat of the briefing was deceptive.

One of the things that could be done was you could take something that was part of the Department of Defense, make it part of the intelligence community, and put a caveat to that, and make that whatever the intelligence community is doing for support will ultimately be given a different caveat. So when the defense committees on the Hill come calling, you say, you can’t look at that because that’s an intelligence program.


TICE: But when the intelligence program comes calling, you say you can’t look at that because it is a Department of Defense program.


TICE: So you basically have a little shell game that you are playing back and forth.

OLBERMANN: It’s brilliant in its simplicity. It’s wonderful in its simplicity in a different context.

Last question here, what happens now? Can the Obama administration stop this? That is the first part. And, secondly, has anybody from the Obama administration been in touch with you about this?

TICE: No. Well, I’ve been in touch with — basically, I volunteered for the Obama administration to act as a, you know, if they needed a consultant for intelligence. And this was last February. And they said they knew who I was, you know, my background with the agency, but they never really utilized me. I helped out as a volunteer yesterday in the inauguration, but certainly not in that capacity.


TICE: So, you know, I even said I would go on camera for them if they wanted a commercial, but they really didn’t utilize that.

But I did send a letter to — I think it’s Mr. Brennan — a handwritten letter, because I knew all my communications were tapped — my phones, my computer, and I have had the FBI on me sort of like flies on you know what. And so I made sure it was handwritten. And I’m assuming that he gave the note to our current president, that I intended to say a little bit more than I had in the past.

OLBERMANN: And you have done that. I think, if it’s all right with you, I think we are going to have to do another interview tomorrow.

TICE: Certainly.

OLBERMANN: There is much — there are only about twice as many questions left.

Russell Tice, former NSA intelligence analyst. It sounds corny, thank you for doing this for the country.

TICE: Well, you know, I raised my hand, just like the president, and my oath was to support and defend the Constitution, not a director of an agency, not a classification on a piece of paper, but ultimately the Constitution. And these things were against the law that were happening. So I was just doing my job, really.

OLBERMANN: Well, yes, but doing your job sometimes earns you the lapel pin, the flag pin. Thank you, sir.

TICE: Thank you.


Did NSA breaks the Thomas A. Drake hushmail messages?

April 18, 2010

Thomas Andrews Drake is accused of copying and storing classified documents at his home and then destroying the documents and lying to investigators when authorities found out.

Did the authorities used the messages he send to the unidentified journalist on his account at Hushmail or they used the archives at his home ?

Since its debut in 1999, Hushmail has dominated a unique market niche for highly-secure webmail with its innovative, client-side encryption engine.

Hushmail uses industry-standard cryptographic and encryption protocols (OpenPGP and AES 256) to scramble the contents of messages stored on their servers. They also host the public key needed for other people using encrypted email services to send secure messages to a Hushmail account.(From Ryan Singel’s Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds – November 7, 2007)

James Bamford, who has written three trailblazing books on NSA operations and misdeeds since 1980, said many questions remain unanswered about “what kind of investigation was done,” such as whether government agents tapped Gorman’s conversations with a court order or not.

“If they had his e-mails,” he said in a brief interview, “they wouldn’t need a separate subpoena for hers.”

Drake’s alleged complaints about NSA overspending in its “Trailblazer” program weren’t unusual, Bamford said.
From Jeff Stein’s Government could read alleged NSA leaker’s encrypted e-mails )

Drake faces up to 40 years in prison.

It’s very unusual for the government to bring a case like this, and it’s telling that the charges do not include the act of actually leaking classified information. That may be an effort to prevent Drake from introducing sensitive information about the program at trial — which is one reason why these types of cases are rarely brought in the first place. Or, perhaps, prosecutors agreed not to charge Drake with the most serious charge provided he provide explicit detail about everything he did. (NSA Employee Indicted for ‘Trailblazer’ Leaks)


NSA Killed System That Sifted Phone Data Legally (by Siobhan Gorman)

April 18, 2010

Published on Thursday, May 18, 2006 by the Baltimore Sun

Sources say project was shelved in part because of bureaucratic infighting

by Siobhan Gorman

WASHINGTON — The National Security Agency developed a pilot program in the late 1990s that would have enabled it to gather and analyze massive amounts of communications data without running afoul of privacy laws. But after the Sept. 11 attacks, it shelved the project — not because it failed to work — but because of bureaucratic infighting and a sudden White House expansion of the agency’s surveillance powers, according to several intelligence officials.

The agency opted instead to adopt only one component of the program, which produced a far less capable and rigorous program. It remains the backbone of the NSA’s warrantless surveillance efforts, tracking domestic and overseas communications from a vast databank of information, and monitoring selected calls.

Four intelligence officials knowledgeable about the program agreed to discuss it with The Sun only if granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

The program the NSA rejected, called ThinThread, was developed to handle greater volumes of information, partly in expectation of threats surrounding the millennium celebrations. Sources say it bundled together four cutting-edge surveillance tools. ThinThread would have:

* Used more sophisticated methods of sorting through massive phone and e-mail data to identify suspect communications.

* Identified U.S. phone numbers and other communications data and encrypted them to ensure caller privacy.

* Employed an automated auditing system to monitor how analysts handled the information, in order to prevent misuse and improve efficiency.

* Analyzed the data to identify relationships between callers and chronicle their contacts. Only when evidence of a potential threat had been developed would analysts be able to request decryption of the records.

An agency spokesman declined to discuss NSA operations.

“Given the nature of the work we do, it would be irresponsible to discuss actual or alleged operational issues as it would give those wishing to do harm to the U.S. insight and potentially place Americans in danger,” said NSA spokesman Don Weber in a statement to The Sun

“However, it is important to note that NSA takes its legal responsibilities very seriously and operates within the law.”

In what intelligence experts describe as rigorous testing of ThinThread in 1998, the project succeeded at each task with high marks. For example, its ability to sort through massive amounts of data to find threat-related communications far surpassed the existing system, sources said. It also was able to rapidly separate and encrypt U.S.-related communications to ensure privacy.

But the NSA, then headed by Air Force Gen. Michael V. Hayden, opted against both of those tools, as well as the feature that monitored potential abuse of the records. Only the data analysis facet of the program survived and became the basis for the warrantless surveillance program.

The decision, which one official attributed to “turf protection and empire building,” has undermined the agency’s ability to zero in on potential threats, sources say. In the wake of revelations about the agency’s wide gathering of U.S. phone records, they add, ThinThread could have provided a simple solution to privacy concerns.

A number of independent studies, including a classified 2004 report from the Pentagon’s inspector-general, in addition to the successful pilot tests, found that the program provided “superior processing, filtering and protection of U.S. citizens, and discovery of important and previously unknown targets,” said an intelligence official familiar with the program who described the reports to The Sun. The Pentagon report concluded that ThinThread’s ability to sort through data in 2001 was far superior to that of another NSA system in place in 2004, and that the program should be launched and enhanced.

Hayden, the president’s nominee to lead the CIA, is to appear Thursday before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and is expected to face tough questioning about the warrantless surveillance program, the collection of domestic phone records and other NSA programs.

While the furor over warrantless surveillance, particularly collection of domestic phone records, has raised questions about the legality of the program, there has been little or no discussion about how it might be altered to eliminate such concerns.

ThinThread was designed to address two key challenges: The NSA had more information than it could digest, and, increasingly, its targets were in contact with people in the United States whose calls the agency was prohibited from monitoring.

With the explosion of digital communications, especially phone calls over the Internet and the use of devices such as BlackBerries, the NSA was struggling to sort key nuggets of information from the huge volume of data it took in.

By 1999, as some NSA officials grew increasingly concerned about millennium-related security, ThinThread seemed in position to become an important tool with which the NSA could prevent terrorist attacks. But it was never launched. Neither was it put into effect after the attacks in 2001. Despite its success in tests, ThinThread’s information-sorting system was viewed by some in the agency as a competitor to Trailblazer, a $1.2 billion program that was being developed with similar goals. The NSA was committed to Trailblazer, which later ran into trouble and has been essentially abandoned.

Both programs aimed to better sort through the sea of data to find key tips to the next terrorist attack, but Trailblazer had more political support internally because it was initiated by Hayden when he first arrived at the NSA, sources said.

NSA managers did not want to adopt the data-sifting component of ThinThread out of fear that the Trailblazer program would be outperformed and “humiliated,” an intelligence official said.

Without ThinThread’s data-sifting assets, the warrantless surveillance program was left with a sub-par tool for sniffing out information, and that has diminished the quality of its analysis, according to intelligence officials.

Sources say the NSA’s existing system for data-sorting has produced a database clogged with corrupted and useless information.

The mass collection of relatively unsorted data, combined with system flaws that sources say erroneously flag people as suspect, has produced numerous false leads, draining analyst resources, according to two intelligence officials. FBI agents have complained in published reports in The New York Times that NSA leads have resulted in numerous dead ends.

The privacy protections offered by ThinThread were also abandoned in the post-Sept. 11 push by the president for a faster response to terrorism.

Once President Bush gave the go-ahead for the NSA to secretly gather and analyze domestic phone records — an authorization that carried no stipulations about identity protection — agency officials regarded the encryption as an unnecessary step and rejected it, according to two intelligence officials knowledgeable about ThinThread and the warrantless surveillance programs.

“They basically just disabled the [privacy] safeguards,” said one intelligence official.

Another, a former top intelligence official, said that without a privacy requirement, “there was no reason to go back to something that was perhaps more difficult to implement.”

However two officials familiar with the program said the encryption feature would have been simple to implement. One said the time required would have involved minutes, not hours.

Encryption would have required analysts to be more disciplined in their investigations, however, by forcing them to gather what a court would consider sufficient information to indicate possible terrorist activity before decryption could be authorized.

While it is unclear why the agency dropped the component that monitored for abuse of records, one intelligence official noted that the feature was not popular with analysts. It not only tracked the use of the database, but hunted for the most effective analysis techniques, and some analysts thought it would be used to judge their performance.

Within the NSA, the primary advocate for the ThinThread program was Richard Taylor, who headed the agency’s operations division. Taylor who has retired from the NSA, did not return calls seeking comment.

Officials say that after the successful tests of ThinThread in 1998, Taylor argued that the NSA should implement the full program. He later told the 9/11 Commission that ThinThread could have identified the hijackers had it been in place before the attacks, according to an intelligence expert close to the commission.

But at the time, NSA lawyers viewed the program as too aggressive. At that point, the NSA’s authority was limited strictly to overseas communications, with the FBI responsible for analyzing domestic calls. The lawyers feared that expanding NSA data collection to include communications in the United States could violate civil liberties, even with the encryption function.

Taylor had an intense meeting with Hayden and NSA lawyers. “It was a very emotional debate,” recalled a former intelligence official. “Eventually it was rejected by [NSA] lawyers.”

After the 2001 attacks, the NSA lawyers who had blocked the program reversed their position and approved the use of the program without the enhanced technology to sift out terrorist communications and without the encryption protections.

The NSA’s new legal analysis was based on the commander in chief’s powers during war, said former officials familiar with the program. The Bush administration’s defense has rested largely on that argument since the warrantless surveillance program became public in December.

The strength of ThinThread’s approach is that by encrypting information on Americans, it is legal regardless of whether the country is at war, according to one intelligence official.

Officials familiar with Thin Thread say some within NSA were stunned by the legal flip-flop. ThinThread “was designed very carefully from a legal point of view, so that even in non-wartime, you could have done it legitimately,” the official said.

In a speech in January, Hayden said the warrantless surveillance program was not only limited to al-Qaida communications, but carefully implemented with an eye toward preserving the Constitution and rights of Americans.

“As the director, I was the one responsible to ensure that this program was limited in its scope and disciplined in its application,” he said.

Copyright © 2006, The Baltimore Sun